Integration and Technological Capability Accumulation In International Joint Venture in China by Li, Huiping
Integration and Technological Capability Accumulation In 





This study examines how Chinese state-owned enterpris s (SOEs) have accessed the 
global resources of multinational corporations (MNCs) by forming international joint 
ventures (IJVs), thus improving their technological pability.     
 
The study focuses on the benefit of foreign direct investment (FDI) at the firm level.  
Looking into the way businesses acquire institutional knowledge, the study examines 
whether IJVs have built local technological capability through acquiring and then using 
the international resources and knowledge of the for ign joint venture partners, and if so, 
the level of the technological capability that they have been able to develop as a result.  
This study also examines how the technological capability is accumulated, by studying 
integration mechanisms of the joint venture, in particular, the joint venture's relationship 
with its foreign parent, and with the foreign parent’s affiliates.   In this way I identify the 
mechanisms IJVs employ to build local technological capability and the determinants of 
the rate at which they are able to build such capability.    
 
Following the framework for evaluating technology at the operational level developed by 
Bell and Pavitt (1995) and Lall (1992) (see Table 2-1), the study examines the 
determinants of technology building at given levels of development and the different 
processes by which firms may advance to higher levels of technological competence 
The data reported in this study was collected from IJVs engaged in manufacturing, by 
means of a survey questionnaire  (see Appendix 1).  The survey was administered 
through the questionnaire and by face-to-face follow-up interviews of IJV managers in 
the cities of Beijing and Shanghai, and the provinces of Jiangsu, Tianjin and Zhejiang. 
 
It is hoped that this study will advance the international business community's 
understanding in two areas.  While much literature has focused on how MNCs build their 
technological capability to compete in mature economic markets, this paper explores 
instead how joint ventures can exploit those resources to improve the competence of 
businesses operating in a newly developing economic market.     
 
The second contribution of this study is to track the evolution of technology building by 
analyzing the organizational issues of the internatio l joint venture.  By using IJVs as 
the analytical setting, the study can compare different processes of joint ventures and 
determine how those differences affect a firm's ability to successfully accumulate 
technological capability.   
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section discusses theoretical issues related to technological capability accumulation, 
paying attention to the current literature related to that subject.  Section 2.1 examines the 
structure of the international joint venture, Section 2.2 looks at technology and learning, 
Section 2.3 reviews the literature related to technological capability, and Section 2.4 
discusses possible determinants of technological capability development in China in the 
context of IJVs, proposing hypothetically the linkage between four such determinants and 
technological capability accumulation. 
       
2.1 International Joint Ventures 
Joint ventures are arrangements where a new, separat  entity is created by the 
combination of the resources of two or more parent companies (Inkpen & Beamish, 
1997).  The joint ventures in this study are the product of firms from different countries 
cooperating across national and cultural boundaries (Yan & Luo, 2001).  My study 
focuses on foreign firms going into business with a local Chinese partner.  For many 
years this was practically the only method by which foreign companies could invest in 
China.  The investment regulations pertaining to equity contribution and control of the 
joint venture have heavily favored the local Chinese partners.  The Chinese government 
has been keen to ensure that too much control does n t reside in the hands of foreign 
investors (even though it was also keen to attract foreign money).   
 
The joint venture partnership is an arrangement at he strategic level.  It has two 
dimensions, one is interdependence, and the other is r c procity.  Joint ventures represent 
reciprocal exchanges among partner firms that cannot be explained as market-based, 
arm’s length exchanges (Das & Teng, 2002).  They typically involve the exchange of an 
important asset, usually knowledge/learning, and technology or market access.  A joint 
venture partnership can be one of the quickest and most cost-effective ways to grow a 
business, or it can be used as a defensive measure to counteract business initiatives of 
competitors.  
 
From the MNC’s perspective, a joint venture can achieve at least seven overlapping 
objectives: risk reduction, economies of scale and/or rationalization, technology 
exchanges, co-opting or blocking competition, overcoming government-mandated trade 
or investment barriers, facilitating initial international expansion of inexperienced firms, 
and vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary contributions of 
the partners in a “value chain” (Contractor & Lorange, 1988).   
 
The primary motive for Chinese companies to form joint ventures with foreign 
companies is to access the unique organizational management skills and capabilities of 
the foreign entities (Luo, 2001), and to generate exports and gain technology transfers 
(Rosen, 1999).  As China opened its door to the outside world, Chinese businesses came 
to realize the importance of a firm’s organizational structure and management capabilities 
in gaining competitive advantage in the domestic Chinese marketplace.   Chinese 
companies engage in joint ventures to exploit the value of a foreign partner’s resources.  
Collaborations with foreign companies are a useful vehicle for enhancing functional 
knowledge in critical areas where the desired level of knowledge is lacking and “cannot 
be developed within an acceptable timeframe or cost” (Madhok, 1997, Das & Teng 
2002).  As Chinese companies were making the transiio  from a planned economy to a 
market economy, joint ventures became preferred whenever “the critical inputs required 
to pursue the opportunity are owned by different parties and when these inputs are 
inseparable from other assets of the owner firms” (Ramanathan et al, 1997, Das & Teng 
2002). Collaboration with foreign companies offers the chance to learn foreign 
management skills as well as technology.  
 
Therefore, “organizational learning” is a viable goal and rationale for joint venture 
formation.     
 
In the current research, I focus on joint ventures in the manufacturing sector because the 
effects of learning on value creation are stronger for the research and production joint 
venture and weaker for the marketing joint venture (Anand & Khanna, 2000).  As 
globalization increases, many cross-border joint ventures are created by domestic 
partners intending to access knowledge, skills, and resources that cannot be internally 
produced in a timely or cost-effective fashion (Yan & Luo, 2001).  Empirical studies 
have found that “equity” joint ventures are more effective in transmitting learning than 
are “contract-based” alliances, such as those arising through licensing agreements 
(Mowery, Oxley  & Silverman, 1996, Shenkar & Li, 1999).  The joint venture is the 
organizational form that is most likely to produce a natural (that is, unplanned-for) 
transfer of knowledge, since employees from both firms work closely together.   The joint 
venture form also provides a good mechanism for local SOEs to accumulate 
technological capability because much technical knowledge is of the “embedded” variety.   
 
2.2.1.1 Technology and Learning 
There are two complementary elements of technology:  “public knowledge” and 
“embedded knowledge.”  At one end of a spectrum is public knowledge, that is, 
knowledge that can be accessed by the general public.  On the other end is deeply-
embedded knowledge, referred to as “tacit” knowledge, which may consist of routines 
and processes that often are proprietary and can be observed only by the owning firm. 
 
“Technological capability” is itself an embedded, or tacit, knowledge (the second element 
of technology).  Tacit capabilities are the result of internal learning processes; they are 
embedded within these processes (Cantwell, 1991; Cantwell & Barrera, 1998).  
Technological capability cannot be traded, it can only be imitated, “with or without 
assistance” from the originating firm (Cantwell, 199 ).  These skills, routines and 
processes are developed over time in a gradual process involving trial and error, and they 
are a primary source of competitive (or ownership, in the OLI paradigm) advantage 
(Dunning, 1993).  
 
Tacit knowledge is difficult, time-consuming and exp nsive to transfer, and is more 
likely to be transferred internally (Sachwald, 1998).  Kogut and Zander (1993) suggest 
that as complexity increases, so too does the probability that a MNC will transfer 
knowledge internally.  Ultimately, this implies tha the more complex (or the more 
“tacit”) the technology to be transferred, the more lik ly it is to be transferred internally, 
rather than relying on market mechanisms.   
 
Learning between firms is more likely to be useful if the two firms are more 
complementary in terms of technological specialization (Cantwell & Barrera, 1998).  
Complementary technological capability is likely to be a key factor in joint venture 
partner selection.  As Mowery et al. (1998) pointed out, “firms jointly pursuing 
collaborative development of a technology or product within an alliance are likely to 
require some level of technological ‘overlap,’ to facilitate know-how exchange and 
development.”  This technological similarity is an important consideration, potentially a 
condition for effective learning.  
 
Another potential condition for effective learning to take place is that each partner’s 
competence should come from a different set of resources.  Sachwald (1998) supports 
this by stating that “cooperation is more likely when the required competences result 
from a very distinct set of resources” because integration “is costly, time-consuming and 
risky, so the firms may choose cooperation as a more efficient solution.”   In the case of 
the IJV, Chinese companies want to learn foreign technology while foreign firms want to 
acquire a deeper understanding of the local Chinese markets and the “guanxi” network/ 
distribution system (Luo, 2000).   
 
However, the joint venture is not an alternative to in-house development (Cantwell & 
Barrera, 1998).  “When joint venture (alliance) is u ed by one firm to internalize new 
technology-based capabilities from a partner, the demands of the technology absorption 
process are such that the ‘student’ must have considerable in-house technical expertise 
that complements the technology development activities of the IJV (alliance)” (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1988, Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996).  Learning can further 
organizational capabilities (Gulati, 1999).   The IJVs are evolutionary and learning 
entities that have both the resources and incentive to ncourage innovation and create 
new institutional arrangements, thereby acting to speed up evolution (Hedlund, 1986).   
 
2.2.1.2  The Process of Technological Capability Building  
Technological capability refers to the capacity of joint ventures to generate and manage 
technological change.  This involves technology-changing skills -- a body of knowledge 
and experience that is often substantially different from what is needed to operate 
existing systems.   Innovative IJVs are able to change or improve given technologies.  
Capability building reflects the extent to which an IJV commits to building new 
capabilities through learning from other organizations, creating new skills, or revitalizing 
existing skills in new situations (Luo,  2002).   As international competition spreads, 
there is less opportunity derive profits from sheer market power -- the bargaining strength 
that allows firms to set higher prices in product markets, but to pay lower wages and 
lower prices to contractors.  Positions of dominatig market power are difficult to sustain 
and are being steadily eroded  (Cantwell, 1991).  The source of competitive advantage in 
today’s markets is a firm’s ability to generate and manage technological changes.  
 
Technological capability is a cumulative process, due in part to the process of 
incremental learning and due also to the evolutionary process of developing locally-
refined skills and routines.  Technological change is incremental, in that it represents “the 
cumulative impact of small improvements” (Rosenberg, 1982).  Routines only change 
slowly through careful experimentation, learning-by-doing and learning-by-using.   The 
cumulative process also results from the need for critical revision, when one advance 
gives rise to or inspires other advances in the same field of activity (Cantwell, 1991).  
The effective development of technology seems to depend less on linear logic than on 
identifying or imposing patterns and connections; experience with present products and 
processes often provides better guidance than scientific principles (Loasby,1998).  New 
product and process developments are likely to lie in the technological neighborhood of 
previous successes (Teece, 1998).   
 
The taxonomy of technological capabilities for the joint venture draws on the analytical 
framework proposed by Bell & Pavitt (1995), Lall (1992); and, in particular, for the 
manufacturing industry in developing countries, on the adaptations carried out by Ariffin 
(2002), Figueiredo (2003), Figueiredo (2001), Dutrénit et al (2003) and Dutrénit, Vera-
Cruz & Arias (2004).  The taxonomy is based on the evidence of the characteristics of the 
accumulation processes of technological capabilities n manufacturing joint ventures.   
 
There are four levels of technological capabilities: one level of routine production 
technological capabilities, and three levels of innovative technological capabilities – 
basic, intermediate, and advanced.   
 
Basic operative capability is the capability to produce goods at given levels of 
efficiency and given input requirements.  It may be described as technology-using skills 
and knowledge.    
 
Innovative technological capability is defined as the capability to change or improve 
products and processes.  It may be described as change-generating capability or 
technology-changing skill (Bell & Pavitt, 1995).    
 
At the basic operative capability level, the IJV has the ability to assimilate technology, 
and replicate the basic production methodologies.   At the basic innovative capability 
level, the IJV has the ability to make incremental changes of process to improve quality.   
At the intermediate innovative capability level, the IJV has full production skills and 
the capability for process innovation and product design.  At the advanced innovative 
capability level, the IJV conducts its own R&D for products and processes (linked to 
market needs), and can establish product innovation capabilities on its own.   
 
The taxonomy distinguishes the technical functions in which technological capabilities 
are developed. There are three technical functions which apply to manufactures: (i) 
investment functions: including decision-making contr l, project preparation and 
implementation of large investment projects, or upgrading projects; (ii) production 
functions: referring to the generation and management of technical change in processes, 
products, and production organization; and (iii) supporting functions: consisting of the 
development of links and interactions for innovative activity. 
 
Investment capabilities are the skills needed before a new facility is commissioned or an 
existing plant is expanded.  They entail identifying eeds; preparing to acquire and 
acquiring necessary technology; and designing, constructing, equipping and staffing the 
facility.  They also entail determining the capital costs of the project, as well as the 
appropriateness of the scale, product mix, technology, and equipment selected, and the 
understanding gained by the operating firm of the basic technologies involved (which, in 
turn, affects the efficiency with which it later operates the facility).  The investment 
function in my study is not limited only to the hardware investment; it also includes 
upgrading software and information technologies.  The use of information technology 
will lead to a larger number and variety of people articipating as information sources in 
the making of decisions, while decreasing the number and variety of people engaged in 
traditional face-to-face interactions.  Effective use of IT will also result in less 
organizational time being taken up by decision-related meetings.    
 
Production capabilities range from basic skills like quality control, operation, and 
maintenance, to more advanced ones like adaptation, improvement, or equipment 
"stretching," to the most demanding ones of research, design, and innovation. These 
capabilities affect both process and product technologies.  The skills involved determine 
not only how well given technologies are operated an improved, but also how effective 
are in-house efforts to absorb technologies imported or imitated from other firms.  
 
Linkage capabilities are skills needed to transmit information, know-how and 
technology to, or receive them from, component and raw material suppliers, 
subcontractors, and customers.  Such linkages affect not only the productive efficiency of 
the IJV (allowing it to specialize more fully), but also the infusion of technology 
throughout the economy -- thus deepening the industrial structure -- both of which are 
essential to industrial development.  The significance of extra-market linkages in 
promoting increases in productivity is well recognized in the literature discussing 
developed countries.  
 
To be successful, a business must provide value to its customers, be competitive and 
differentiated in the market, and possess core competencies.  There are a number of 
alternative approaches for IJVs to consider when pursuing these goals.   
 
Acquiring a thorough understanding of the market, assessing the needs of the market and 
developing an effective business plan to exploit ths knowledge will significantly 
improve a firm’s likelihood of success.  (This atten ion to the market, of course, was 
totally foreign to Chinese state-run businesses that were operating within a planned 
economy.)   Assessing the needs of a defined market nd filling a void in that market is 
also an effective way for IJVs to achieve sustainable competitive advantage.  In this 
regard, rarely will it suffice merely to manufacture a technologically-innovative product.  
One must also develop capabilities to acquire resources to finance sustainable growth, to 
market the product effectively and to interact efficiently with distribution channels. 
 
In the evolutionary view, technological knowledge is not an immediately usable product 
in its own right, but is rather a tool in the collective corporate learning process by which 
tacit capability, and hence technology, as a whole is generated.  It is an input that 
normally is most relevant to the learning process of the joint venture that both created it 
and fixed the problem-solving agenda to which it represents a response.  Thus, it is likely 
to be of the greatest value to the joint venture. 
 
Table 2-1 presents the taxonomy of technological capabilities for the manufacturing 
industry.  It illustrates each stage in the accumulation of each technical function, and lists 
the activities most characteristic of each level. 
 
TABLE 2-1: Taxonomy of Technological Capabilities 
Investment functions  Production functions Supporting 
functions 
Main           
Activities  
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Source: Adopted from Bell & Pavitt (1995), Lall (1992). 
 
Learning is a dynamic, mostly-incremental process that unfolds over time and builds 
upon both current and previous knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1986).   From the joint 
venture partner’s perspective, learning can be takeplace in several ways.  The joint 
venture can learn about its partner, from its partner and with its partners  (Doz & Hamele 
1998, Inkpen, 2002).   
 
The IJV enters into a social community of sorts, that as its own unique methods to foster 
cooperation and communication, methods that can be used internally to exchange tacit 
knowledge (Kogut & Zander 1993).  One of the key aspects of an organizational 
boundary expansion is the firm’s ability to coordinate and internally transfer tacit 
knowledge.   Kogut &  Zander (1993) and Grant (1996).   Kogut and Zander (1993) 
postulated that the survival of the firm is not so much related to market failure or 
opportunism, as it is to the effectiveness of its technology exchanges.  “What determines 
what the firm does, is not the failure of the market, but the firm’s efficiency in this 
process (knowledge transfer) relative to other firms” (Kogut and Zander, 1993).  That is 
to say, a firm’s existence and effectiveness are dependent upon its ability to internally 
create and diffuse knowledge.  
 
Accumulation of technology within the international network of an IJV is a path-
dependent learning process.  Effective learning is reflected by an enhancement of an 
organization’s skills and capabilities.  Determining which vertical and horizontal links 
will be allowed to exist within a global network (that is, defining the IJV’s boundaries) is 
a critical supervisory function of MNC management.  As this study confirms, alliances 
between IJVs and their foreign parents and affiliates have given local Chinese businesses 
opportunities for knowledge accumulation beyond their own internal resources.   
  
This study aims to empirically investigate the relationship -- between technological 
capability building and integration mechanisms: integration with headquarters, 
integration with other subsidiaries, interdependence and autonomy.  That is to say, the 
study examines the technological capability accumulation and the consequences of 
establishing a multiplicity of links with foreign parents and their subsidiaries.   
 
2.2.3.1  Direct Integration Mechanisms with the MNC Headquarters 
 It is recognized that particular forms of organization influence the directions and rates of 
technological progress (Dosi, Giannetti, and Toninelli, 1992). 
 
Direct integration mechanisms with the MNC headquarters consist of many forms of 
contact and communication between the managers of foreign subsidiaries and 
headquarters.  Each particular mechanism shares a common goal of creating a mutual 
understanding between subsidiary and headquarters management regarding the interests 
of the overall corporation and the role of the subsidiary  (O’Donnell, 2000).  Winter 
(2003) suggests that firms tend to handle the innovati n process in a systematic way and 
develop – largely through trial and error – “routines” that guide their actions.  
Importantly, these routines are learned over time and they are highly firm-specific.  Each 
organization develops its own particular way of doing things.  And this can often be a 
source of competitive advantage.  
 
An IJV’s relationship with Headquarters is one of the most important aspects of its 
integration into the global network.  That relationship may determine the degree to which 
its managers will successfully adapt to the foreign partner’s routine and acquire the 
parent’s best practices.  Managing rapid growth presents a formidable challenge for IJV 
managers.  Training and development programs sponsored by the foreign parent can ease 
this task.  
 
Commonly, vertical integration of a joint venture sub idiary begins with the subsidiary’s 
managers’  participating  in executive development programs, in which manager from 
headquarters and the subsidiary spend time together a  Headquarters.  A major challenge 
for the IJV is to bridge the cultural divide between different languages and traditions, 
which can undermine the process of information sharing.  To avoid cultural 
misunderstandings, participants from the parent and subsidiary must spend time together, 
willing to learn and embracing their exposure to new ideas and customs  (Rosen, 1999).   
One would expect then that technological innovation capability will be positively 
associated with the use of integration mechanisms by the MNC Headquarters.  
  
Hypothesis 1:  The level of technological innovation capability is positively associated 
with the extent of the integration mechanisms with MNC HQ. 
   
2.2.3.2  Integration Mechanisms with MNC Affiliates 
Intra organization networks shape innovation dynamics and diffusion rates.  Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1990) point out that “by creating flexible linkages that allow the efforts of 
multiple units to be combined, a company can create synergies that can significantly 
leverage its innovation process.”  Teece (1998) observes that different units “must be in 
close and continuous communication and engage in mutual adaptation if innovation… is 
to have a chance of succeeding.”  Clearly, there is broad consensus that it is critical for 
companies to create an environment that encourages information sharing across its 
organizational and geographic borders.  The IJVs with technological capability are those 
best able to gather new information from its internal network, to get informal 
communications between managers from different international locations and to seek 
advice from managers of different international locations.    Learning requires resources 
of various kinds, as well as skillful organization a d management. It is not automatic, and 
the direction it takes depends on the decisions the joint ventures make.  The resources can 
be hierarchical as well as lateral.  
 
Forming a joint venture is an important strategic action and the aggregation of such joint 
ventures constitutes a network.  Resources inhere not so much within the firm as in the 
inter- or intra-firm networks in which the firm is located. The network ties accumulated 
over time can facilitate information exchanges that enable joint ventures to learn about 
new technologies, products and processes, and to learn how to improve their decision-
making and linkage with customers/suppliers.   
 
Hypothesis 2:  The level of technological innovation capability is positively associated 
with the extent of integration mechanisms with the MNC network. 
 
 
2.2.3.3  International Interdependence 
International interdependence refers to the condition in which one sub-unit of the MNC 
relies on another sub-unit’s activities or input in order to perform its role effectively 
(O’Donnell, 2000). The business activities of the IJVs may be connected to the activities 
of headquarters or other foreign subsidiaries, or the IJV may depend upon the effective 
functioning of headquarters or other foreign subsidiar es to keep performing its own tasks 
effectively.   
 
In like fashion, the activities of headquarters or other foreign subsidiaries may influence 
the outcomes of the IJV, and the headquarters or foreign subsidiaries may depend upon 
the IJV to effectively perform their tasks.   
 
Firms collaborate to reduce the cost, time or risk of accessing unfamiliar technologies or 
markets.  The networks thus formed are the most appropriate to facilitate an IJV’s 
capability building.  A network is as much a process a  a structure, which both constrains 
the IJVs, and in turn is shaped by IJVs. Therefore, th  collaboration can be understood as 
an attempt to cope with the increasing complexity and inter-relatedness of different 
technologies and markets.  
 
Collaboration enables IJVs to pool resources or expertise and to work together to gain 
market knowledge.  International interdependence is, to a large extent, an interactive 
process and the result of joint venture choices and decisions; a process that needs to be 
harnessed and even directed. That cooperation across b rders -- exemplifying 
international interdependence -- is what actualizes th  powerful potential of this process 
to advance technological capability.    
 
The largest, most technologically-savvy firms rely upon international networks for the 
accumulation of technological competencies that are dispersed both geographically and 
by business sector.  However, the management of these n tworks remains a difficult and 
complex organizational task.  For this reason, firms which have developed such networks 
have tended to target either a wider geographical dspersion of technological competence, 
or alternatively a wider dispersion of interrelated competencies by sector across 
technological fields that are more confined geographically.   
 
Integration of the IJV into a developed economy should be seen as a comprehensive 
process, and it cannot be accomplished without cooperation and partnership.  
Technological know-how acquired through interactions with other countries may be the 
most important mechanism for IJVs from developing countries to become integrated into 
the international economy.  The importance of strengthening the endogenous base of 
technological growth and development cannot be overemphasized.  
  
 This is easier said than done.  In the first place, Chinese joint ventures need to become 
acclimatized to a culture of international cooperation.  Moreover, foreign technological 
activity today often aims to tap into local fields of expertise  -- expertise that domestic 
Chinese firms sometimes need to develop from scratch.    
 
Increasingly multinational companies are committed to the development of international 
networks in order to exploit the potential of divers  geographically-scattered centers of 
competence.  International interdependence is thus very much at work.  
 
Hypothesis 3:  The level of technological innovation capability is positively associated 
with the degree of international interdependence.  
 
2.2.3.4  IJV Autonomy 
IJV autonomy is defined as the degree to which the IJV “has strategic and operational 
decision making authority” (Hill & Hellriegel, 1994).  Another definition was given by 
Björkman (2003), who defines subsidiary autonomy in the context of an MNC as the 
extent to which decision-making is taking place in the subsidiary without interference 
from the headquarters.  To be autonomous, the subsidiary must have independence from 
the parent across all business activities. 
 
The level of JV autonomy can differ significantly depending on the characteristics of the 
MNC and subsidiary, and environmental factors (Björkman 2003).  The degree to which 
IJVs exercise control over their own affairs varies greatly.  At one extreme are the IJVs 
that must refer to headquarters for virtually every decision.  At the other extreme are 
strategically-independent IJVs that enjoy wide latitude to make their own decisions.   
 
In examining whether autonomy is good for the subsidiary, empirical studies so far have 
produced conflicting results.  On one hand,  O’Donnell (2001) posits that the higher the 
degree of autonomy IJV managers have, the more flexibility they have in dealing with the 
challenges they encounter in their particular market and area of industrial specialization.  
To the same effect, Gifford found in his research that joint ventures in developing 
countries appear to respond more favorably when grated high levels of autonomy (Zeira, 
Gifford, 1998).  Autonomy in implementing strategic business plans may be particularly 
important since implementation involves close interaction with the local community.  As 
the Chinese business environment is quite different from the environments in the  U.S. 
and Western Europe, adapting to local business customs could be even more important in 
the case of Sino-Western IJVs located in China (Newburry, W.,  Zeira, Y., Yeheskel, 
O.,2003).   
 
On the other hand, Varblane et al. (2005) conclude that higher autonomy in marketing is 
negatively associated with technology upgrading, as measured by productivity levels, the 
improvement of production equipment, and the quality of finished products.  This is 
consistent with Cohen and Levinthal (1990), who have suggested that an organization 
needs an extended period of time to develop accumulated absorptive capacity.  This 
capacity allows the organization to recognize, assimilate and commercialize valuable 
knowledge.  This capability can only be developed over time, is path-dependent and is 
crucial if the firm is to develop a competitive advntage.  
 
This study postulates that IJVs need to maintain close connections with their MNC 
parents in order to successfully accumulate technological knowledge.   Therefore in this 
study, I hypothesize that joint ventures can build their technological capability b
learning from the headquarters, especially in decisions about changing to a new 
manufacturing process; and that they make better quality-control decisions when the 
corporate partners have a higher level of control over local, on-site managers to make and 
implement decisions on critical business issues.  
 
Hypothesis 4:  The level of technological innovation capability is negatively associated 
with the degree of IJV autonomy.  
 
3.   Methodology 
This section describes the data collection and sample analysis on which this study was 
based.  In the data collection section, I discuss the questionnaire and how the data was 
collected.  In the sample analysis section, I describe the sample joint ventures --  their 
age, size of investment, ownership, country of origin -- and analyze their learning speed.  
 
Data Collection 
This research sampled 51 international joint ventures in China through the submission of 
a detailed survey questionnaire.   All of those surveyed were manufacturers who have 
operated in China for at least two years.  They produce goods in industries such as food 
packaging, equipment fabrication, automobiles, process automation and 
telecommunication.  Several of the joint ventures share common parents, either on the 
Chinese side or the foreign side.    
 
One of the largest industry groups in South China supported this study.   The group, 
which has since disbanded, had 572 members, of which 179 had formed joint ventures 
with foreign companies.   Thirty-one of these IJVs (i.e., 17.3%) responded to this survey.   
Four of them were dropped from this study because they did not supply sufficient data.   
The survey was also distributed among the graduates of Rutgers EMBA program in 
China.  Rutgers initiated an EMBA program in Beijing in 1998.   The EMBA program 
was geared toward employees of high potential working at multinational corporations in 
China.   Many of these graduates are now working in international joint ventures.    The 
survey was sent to 100 Rutgers graduates, 27 of whom (27%) responded.   3 of them have 




Within this manuscript, I have developed hypotheses pr dicting technological capability 
accumulation based upon a set of integration mechanisms. I will empirically test my 
hypotheses in the next stage of the study.   Following is one case study to support my 
hypothesis in the study. 
Case 1:  Integration And Technological Capability Accumulation  
 
Background 
This joint venture between a large European company and East China Fabrication Plant, a 
state-owned enterprise, was established in 1995 upon a total investment of $80-million 
and registered capital of $30-million.  The foreign partner owns 60% of the IJV's equity, 
and has contributed technology and cash to the ventur . The Chinese partner holds a 40% 
equity interest, and has supplied land and equipment to the IJV.   
 
The Chinese partner built the plant in the early 80s on a tract of suburban farmland.  
Local law had required that the plant employ at least 50% of the displaced farmers.  The 
pre-IJV plan was to import equipment to manufacture products thought to have excellent 
market potential.  The management team assumed that the imported equipment would 
enable the plant to manufacture high-quality products.  This assumption proved incorrect.  
After several years and with the assistance of foreign xperts, the plant was only able 
produce material of nine-micron (9u) thickness and i consistent quality.  The plant's 
output averaged around 500 tons per month (one-third of capacity).  By the early 90s, 
management had learned that even the best equipment could not insulate the operation 
from all manufacturing problems.  The company reachd out for a foreign partner to 
furnish technological know-how and management expertise.  
 
The company courted a foreign partner that wanted to “learn to grow” in China.  That 
partner was attracted to this plant by its new, imported equipment (the best in China at 
the time), its excellent location, and by the promise of majority control.  The joint venture 
was formed in 1995 after three years of negotiation.   
 
The IJV hired eight expatriate employees, all upper-level management, to turn the 
operation around.  This management group inherited 330 local employees ("unknowns" 
to the new managers).  The Chinese employees were poorly trained and undereducated.  
There was little manufacturing expertise among them and even less marketing acumen.  
 
During the IJV negotiation, a joint team representing the Chinese and foreign parties had 
performed a marketing feasibility study.  This study revealed that there was a need in the 
marketplace for material gauged at seven microns (7u).  And this gauge was nowhere 
produced in China at the time.  Customs records indicated that material of this gauge was 
being imported into China.  Based on this study, the parties agreed that the foreign 
partner would transfer technology to the IJV for the manufacture of 7u-gauged material.  
 
Learning By Doing 
In its first year the joint venture did not run as smoothly as was anticipated.  The IJV was 
trying to replicate the product and processes of a sister plant overseas.  The foreign 
partner sent 16 technicians to help with the technology transfer.  They provided expertise 
in areas such as production, processing and equipment.  Due to equipment differences, 
the IJV had to modify the production process.  There was an extended period of trial and 
error.  The scrap rate was very high.  The product was bedeviled with quality problems, 
as customer complaints poured in.  The feedback from the IJV's sales department was not 
good; complaints of the “bad quality” of the products demoralized the production 
department.  These problems posed monumental challenges for the sales and marketing 
departments.  The Chinese Party weighed in, registering its disappointment that the 
expertise of the foreign partner had not brought the expected "breakthroughs” in 
innovation and production.  The IJV was not realizing its significant potential for 
incremental innovation.  At that time each innovation was perceived as a single isolated 
change rather than as part of a series of integrated ev nts.  
 
As the IJV failed to meet the performance goals set by he foreign parent, the parent's 
regional manager devoted more and more time applying pressure to the IJV's 
management team for a quick turn-around.  During this process, the regional headquarters 
of the foreign parent replaced the top managers.  The original IJV management team had 
thought technology transfer was just “blue print” transfer, not the gradual learning of 
locally-refined skills and routines.  Nor had it realized that routines only change slowly 
through careful experimentation: learning by doing a d learning by using.  Often the IJV 
was able to find a quick-fix for one quality control problem, only to see others sprout up 
in its place.    
 
Under new management the quality of the product was incrementally improved.    The 
IJV learned that in order to maintain consistent quality, regular maintenance of the 
equipment was essential.  Procedures for this were d v loped.  Later on, with the help of 
the foreign experts, the IJV adapted its manufacturing processes around the condition of 
its equipment and the needs of the local market.  An integrated quality management 
system was implemented.  The IJV was ISO 9000 certified.   Production schedules were 
established to meet the demands of customers.  As the IJV modified its equipment and 
production processes to improve the quality of its product, more product variety was 
introduced.   Now the IJV was able to achieve process innovation based on market 
demand and production requirements.  Through continuous improvement, first with 
outside assistance and later with skills, routines and processes developed within itself 
through trial and error, the IJV became its own primary source of technological 
innovation.  This innovation was its greatest competitiv  advantage.  
 
Efforts To Integrate The IJV Into The Global Network 
From the start of this project, the IJV's foreign parent invested tremendous efforts to 
integrate the IJV into its global network.  Senior managers of the IJV were flown to the 
parent's headquarters to be trained in the values and business mission of the parent.  
Senior managers of the parent traveled to the IJV every few months, for visits of three 
days or longer.  During these visits, issues relating o production, finances and human 
resources management were discussed.  The IJV's management team gave presentations 
to the senior managers on the progress of each department: production, processing, 
purchasing, finance and sales.  The senior managers off ed advice and comments on key 
issues. Through these exchanges, the foreign parent came to understand the operational 
issues of the IJV.  And the IJV managers began to understand the management 
philosophy of the foreign parent.  
 
In the meantime the IJV built strong ties with another subsidiary of the foreign parent, a 
company the IJV came to regard as its "sister."  The sister plant transferred technology 
and a management system to the IJV.   During the first year of the IJV, 30 of its 
employees (equipment operators and workshop maintena c  crews) were dispatched to 
the sister plant for a three-month training program.  During this period, the operators 
worked side-by-side with their counterparts from the sister plant to observe how that 
plant operated.  The training was hands-on: the operators were instructed how to run the 
equipment, and actually manufactured product for sale.  This created an environment in 
which technology was freely shared across organization l and geographic borders.    
 
Because the product mix of the IJV was different than that of its sister plant, the parent 
introduced the IJV to other affiliated plants that could provide technological assistance 
with other products.  Operators from the IJV were dispatched to those plants to learn their 
manufacturing processes.  In this way, the IJV was able to gather new information about 
a wide range of products from an international network of affiliates.  This intra-
organizational network shaped he IJV's innovation dy amics and diffusion rates.   
 
So long as the IJV was dependent upon the training and technical assistance of its foreign 
affiliates, the business of the IJV was limited to what the IJV could copy from those 
affiliates.  But this would change as the IJV develop d its own technological capability.   
 
The IJV fulfilled its technology requirements, developing viable products in 6.5u and 7u 
gauges.  Within four years, the IJV doubled the volume of its average shipment; within 
nine years, that volume had tripled.  The IJV develop d the capacity to do business in 
English and Chinese.  It moved from a “produce for inventory” model to a “produce for 
order” model.  Eventually the IJV was able to manufcture product to a higher standard 
than the IJV contract called for.  The decision to raise its standards was dictated by 
changes in its local market, to which the IJV was able to adapt on its own.  And the IJV 
was able to accomplish all this while remaining faithful to the values and policies of its 
foreign parent.   
 
Four years after the formation of the IJV, the foreign parent acquired two other plants in 
China that produced similar products.  This time the IJV served as the source of technical 
and manufacturing support for its sister affiliates.  With that technical support, including 
assistance in matters of safety, health and environmental protection, the other two 
ventures launched successfully.     
 
Conclusion 
This IJV evolved from a mere receiver of others' technology into a highly competent 
innovator of its own technology.  It emerged as a firm that offered value-added services 
that were leveraged throughout its parent's global network.  It stands as an example of 
how the international joint venture can successfully integrate technological capability not 
merely to copy, but also to advance the technological capabilities of its peer affiliates. 
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